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Abstract: Discussions of democratic socialism have focused on whether that system is compatible with domestic 
civil liberties. Less attention has been paid to its foreign policy implications. Despite the widespread acceptance 
of the democratic peace hypothesis, democratic socialism would be incompatible with peaceful foreign relations. 
Economic intervention and economic planning – even democratic – cannot be successful without insulating the 
domestic economy from foreign competition. This implies economic nationalism and autarky. Moreover, 
democratic socialism is often justified by the notion that the democratic will of the people should be absolutely 
sovereign. Such a conception of democracy has no place for constitutional limits on power. Such an unlimited 
democracy would soon prove illiberal and liable to be captured by a demagogic authoritarian dictator, and this 
would only exacerbate the deleterious foreign policy consequences of economic nationalism. Democratic 
socialism is therefore incompatible with the cosmopolitan and humanitarian values of democratic socialists.
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Discussions of democratic socialism (Friedman 1962: 7, Makovi 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; Ikeda 2016, Boaz 
2016) have tended to focus on the domestic policy of democratic socialism, investigating whether democratic 
socialism – or economic democracy, to be distinguished from social democracy or the mixed economy (Makovi 
2016a) – is compatible with civil liberties. Their negative conclusions have tended to closely follow F. A. Hayek 
(2007 [1944]), who famously argued that democratic socialism would lead us down “the road to serfdom.” Even 
several socialists expressed qualified agreement with Hayek. For example, Maurice Dobb declared that “Either 
planning means overriding the autonomy of separate decisions, or it apparently means nothing at all” (quoted in 
Trygve J. B. Hoff 1981: 267; cf. Hayek 1948: 158). Similarly, H. D. Dickinson remarked that “even if a socialist 
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planner wished to realize freedom he could not do so and remain a planner” (quoted in Hayek 1948: 206). Robert 
Heilbroner was most explicit of all concerning socialism's reliance on command. According to him (1978: 345),
If tradition cannot, and the market system should not, underpin the socialist order, we are left 
with some form of command as the necessary means for securing its continuance and 
adaptation. Indeed, that is what planning means. Command by planning need not, of course, be 
totalitarian. But an aspect of authoritarianism resides inextricably in all planning systems. A plan 
is meaningless if it is not carried out, or if it can be ignored or defied at will. Some form of 
penalty must assure the necessary degree of compliance. Compliance need not be total, and 
penalties need not be Draconian. Incentives may succeed where punishments fail. But planning 
will not assure a socialist society of a capacity to endure or adapt unless the planning is a system 
of effective command. From that conclusion I see no escape.
Heilbroner concluded (1978: 348) that, “What is important, in trying to think about socialism, is to resist the 
delusion that history is so soft and indeterminate that we can have a socialist cake with bourgeois icing.” For this 
reason, Heilbroner said (1978: 347), “The rights of individuals to their Millian liberties . . . [are] directly 
opposed to the basic social commitment to a deliberately embraced collective moral goal.” Heilbroner would 
later add (1986: 126) that “democratic liberties have not yet appeared, except fleetingly, in any nation that has 
declared itself to be fundamentally anticapitalist.”1
Far less has been said, however, about the foreign policy of a democratic socialist government. Perhaps 
this is because it is assumed that according to the democratic peace hypothesis, a democratic socialist 
government will necessarily pursue peaceful relations with foreigners, and that nothing further need be said. This 
essay will question this assumption and propose just as democratic socialism cannot guarantee domestic civil 
liberties, it is equally incompatible with international peace. The foreign policy of a democratic socialist 
government, we shall argue, will tend to be militant, belligerent, and hostile to those abroad, contrary to the 
democratic peace hypothesis.
Democratic socialism, it must be emphasized, embraces government economic planning. While the 
planners are to be guided by the democratic will of the people, democratic socialism nevertheless embraces 
economic planning (Makovi 2016a). For example, Michael Harrington (1978: 357) declares, “What must be 
done—in theory and in practice—is to counterpose democratic planning to command planning.” Compared to 
Soviet-style planning, what Harrington wishes to change is not what is done but merely by whom it is done. 
Discussing democratic socialists in general, Don Lavoie (1985: 135) takes notice of “their insistence that the 
planning they advocate must be decentralized, or 'from the bottom up,' rather than centralized, or 'from the top 
down.'” Lest one mistakenly believe that such decentralized planning implies a rejection of government 
planning, Lavoie (ibid.) immediately adds, “it must be clarified that these writers do believe there will have to be 
one central office that will have to oversee and coordinate the plans of other levels and branches of government.” 
Notwithstanding that the impetus for such planning will originate democratically, this still implies government 
planning of the economy.” 
A democratic socialist government, then, would systematically intervene throughout the operation of the 
economy, both intensively as well as extensively. The question is, what does this mean for foreign policy? It 
turns out that democratic socialism cannot be implemented without resorting to an economic nationalism whose 
implications for foreign policy are contrary to the humanistic values which motivated democratic socialism in 
the first place. Insofar as democratic socialists strive for peace and the protection of human rights, the adoption 
of nationalism implies foreign policies which are incompatible with the goals of democratic socialism. In 
contrast to the vaunted “democratic peace theorem,” democratic socialism would in fact give rise to international 
conflict and antagonism, in violation of democratic values.
This argument was made most clearly by Ludwig von Mises (1985 [1944], esp. ch. 3, pt. 4-10)2 and by 
Gustav Cassel (1934), but it is compatible with Hayek (2007 [1944])'s analysis. Indeed, Hayek approvingly cites 
both Mises and Cassel (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 239f.).3 Mises and Cassel argue that a socialist regime – including a 
democratic one – must, for several reasons be averse to foreign commerce. This opposition to international trade 
in turn implies that militancy, belligerency, and bellicosity will ensue from the consistent pursuit of socialism. 
There are several reasons why a socialist regime would be averse to foreign commerce. First, 
international trade is opposed to the values of socialism because it is a market-based activity. As such foreign 
commerce is ideologically anathema and the truly socialist state is necessarily autarkic (Mises 1985 [1944], 
Osterfeld 1992: 7).4 Furthermore, foreign trade reduces national sovereignty by ceding economic power to the 
foreign trading partner (Mises 1985 [1944], Osterfeld 1992: 181f.). No government can exercise power beyond 
the territory subject to its own sovereignty. Imports must be paid for with exports, and purchasing imports 
requires producing goods for exports which satisfy foreigners. This means the government's domestic economic 
plan must satisfy the whims of fickle foreigners who are not subject to the government's sovereignty. 
International trade therefore hampers any government's power to successfully intervene in the domestic 
economy. A government cannot successfully intervene in its domestic market unless it is insulated from foreign 
markets. In Mises's words (1985 [1944]: 3),
A national government's might is limited to the territory subject to its sovereignty. It does not 
have the power to interfere directly with conditions abroad. Where there is free trade, foreign 
competition would even in the short run frustrate the aims sought by the various measures of 
government intervention with domestic business. When the domestic market is not to some 
extent insulated from foreign markets, there can be no question of government control.
For example, if a state wishes to boost domestic wages in a given industry by establishing minimum 
wages or legally privileging unions, then it must establish trade barriers to keep foreign states from undercutting 
those wages by offering cheaper goods. Contrariwise, when a state is unable to impose such barriers to trade, its 
ability to domestically intervene is limited because any attempt at domestic intervention will too quickly prove 
itself to be self-defeating. Similarly, when the state of Washington tried to legally favor unions, Boeing 
responded by voting with its feet and relocating to the “right to work” state of South Carolina. In such a case, it 
is too obvious that domestic intervention was responsible for undesirable consequences. But had Boeing been 
forbidden to vacate Washington, it would have been more difficult for voters to discern that legal regulations had 
artificially raised the cost of business. Trade restrictions are resorted to as a form of cost-concealment, a means 
by which foreigners are forbidden to expose the manner in which domestic interventionism has raised costs and 
reduced productivity. 
Hence, where there is freedom of international trade, conditions in foreign markets will tend to 
undermine and disrupt the domestic central plan of the socialist state and expose it vacuousness. Where 
international trade is unrestricted, domestic intervention will too quickly prove self-defeating. Therefore, under 
thoroughly consistent socialism, foreign trade must be limited if not entirely precluded so that the state can plan 
with confidence without its sovereignty being undermined. But if imports are banned, then the state must 
militarily conquer those territories which possess desired resources (Mises 1985 [1944], Cassel 1934). The 
logical consequence of such autarky is therefore militant expansionism. Even if militarism is eschewed, it is 
inevitable that foreign antagonisms and conflicts will ensue. It is impossible for two nations to remain on good 
terms when the one nation perceives the other as undermining all of its cherished hopes and dreams.
Lord Percy of Newcastle (1955) made a similar argument. According to him, absolute democracy – 
unlimited sovereignty of the popular will – leads to nationalism, which in turn restricts foreign relations. “[T]he 
very idea of a constitution is essentially repugnant to the pure democrat” (Percy 1955: 61). Further,“a sovereign 
people must not allow its own decrees of yesterday to limit its freedom to meet the needs of today. . . . Thus the 
incompatibility of unmixed democracy with settled law” (Percy 1955: 50). Popular sovereignty cannot tolerate 
any limitations on its own democratic authority. But the General Will cannot easily be determined or expressed 
except at the local level (Percy 1955: 56, 62). One solution to this dilemma, he says, is nationalism (Percy 1955: 
75-110). The sovereign people is united by a common nationality and the constitutionally unlimited General Will 
is expressed at the national level. Similarly, Mises (1985 [1944]: 83) said, “Thus the right of self-determination 
and of government by the people, as expounded by Western liberalism, becomes transformed into the principle 
of nationality.” But such nationalism quickly leads to a closed economic democracy which turns to belligerency 
and militarism. According to Percy (1955: 99f.),
[M]ost of the members of the new family of nations, created by the Peace of Versailles . . . 
existed, so the argument had run, because their peoples were entitled to sovereignty. If their 
governors could not find a way to be democratic nationalists, they were bound to try to assert 
themselves as economic nationalists. For the corporate franchises and the international dealings 
of world capitalism are the most irritating possible challenges to the claim of a sovereign people 
to sole power within its own territory. An economic democracy must be a closed system; hence 
Marx's thesis that it could be established only in a World state as the result of an international 
revolution. ... Thus, to vary the metaphor, the best diagnosis of the convulsions of Europe 
between the wars is that they were the result of economic shock, operating on a constitution 
undermined by the peculiar religious mania of nationalism.
In short, both unlimited democracy and socialism lead to national socialism.. Neither unlimited democracy nor 
socialism nor nationalism can tolerate foreign interference in domestic economic planning nor can they allow 
diminution of domestic popular sovereignty. Therefore, insofar as they are followed consistently to their logical 
ends, they all lead to autarky, belligerency, and militarism, or at least to grating foreign conflicts and antagonism. 
In general, then, domestic interventionism gives rise to antagonism and conflicts of interests among 
nations whereas international trade and foreign commerce are mutually beneficial and create a harmony of 
interests among trading partners. In an ideological climate which favors domestic interventionism, foreigners 
will no longer be seen as offering opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation. Instead, they will be 
perceived as threats who disrupt the domestic economic plan. A nation which accepts international free-trade 
implicitly believes that cooperation with foreigners is beneficial to the nation, and such a nation is unlikely to 
desire to go to war against the same foreigners with whom it was celebrating cooperation just moments prior. By 
contrast, a nation which believes that foreigners pose a threat to domestic democratic sovereignty is less likely to 
see anything incongruous in declaring war against those who pose such threats. A nation's domestic economic 
policy will shape whom it declares to be its friends and its enemies. As Mises says (1990: 210), discussing the 
classical liberal theory of conflict,5 “There is no social doctrine other than that of the 'orthodox' and 'reactionary' 
economists that allow[s] the conclusion that peace is desirable and possible.”6
This relationship between domestic interventionism and foreign militancy helps explain Hayek's 
argument in the Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]) that German National Socialism was not a corruption or 
departure from socialism. Instead, the Nazis had merely pursued socialism to its logical conclusion. According to 
Hayek, the Nazis had simply been more willing than the German Social Democrats to use whatever means were 
necessary to implement socialism (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 146, 160, 182). Similarly, Lord Percy called the Germans 
“an insurgent people, claiming the 'right to work' in a territory sufficiently extended, and a State effectively 
socialized, for that purpose” (Percy 1955: 103; cf. 105). Similarly, Mises (1985 [1944]: 1) explained that “The 
essential point in the plans of the German National Socialist Workers' Party is the conquest of Lebensraum for 
the Germans, i.e. a territory so large and rich in natural resources that they could live in economic self-
sufficiency at a standard not lower than that of any other nation.” Furthermore, (Mises 1984 [1944): 234),
The Nazis also desire government control of business. They also seek autarky for their own 
nation. The distinctive mark of their policies is that they refuse to acquiesce in the disadvantages 
which the acceptance of the same system by other nations would impose upon them. They are 
not prepared to be forever “imprisoned,” as they say, with a comparatively overpopulated area in 
which the productivity of labor is lower than in other countries.
And again (Mises 1984 [1944]: 244):
On the one hand they [the Nazis] saw in an age rapidly moving toward economic autarky a dark 
future for a nation nation which can neither feed nor clothe its citizens out of its domestic 
natural resources. On the other hand they believed that they were powerful enough to avoid this 
calamity by conquering a sufficient amount of Lebensraum.
Democratic socialism's tendency towards economic nationalism and therefore hostile foreign relations is 
exacerbated by the fact that here, democracy would be unlimited and therefore illiberal (Makovi 2016a). 
Democratic socialism is often justified by a conception of democracy as implying the unlimited sovereignty of 
the people. For example, Michael Walzer's defense of democratic socialism argues that value inheres not in the 
socialist outcomes but in the democratic process itself (Walzer 2010, 1978: 358). This means that for Walzer, 
democracy is not a means but an end. Several other advocates of democratic socialism seem to agree, saying for 
example that “the democratic process means allowing people to make direct input into decisions that affect their 
lives” (Lavoie 1985: 127 quoting Tom Hayden) and that we need “active popular participation in the day-to-day 
running of the basic institutions of the economy and the society” (Lavoie 1985: 127 quoting Barry Bluestone and 
Bennett Harrison). In this conception, democracy is not merely a means for obtaining the good – such as by 
restraining governmental abuse of power to protect minorities – but rather, democracy is itself fundamentally 
constitutive of the good. The good is good because it is democratic. It is not the outcomes or benefits of 
democracy which are good, but democracy is itself good regardless of its consequences.7 But when the good is 
defined by the democratic consensus, there is no room left for any constitutional restraints on the exercise of 
democratic power. This may quickly produce an illiberal democracy where there are no constitutional limits on 
power (Percy 1955: 61, Röpke 1998 [1957]: 66, 68, Hayek 1984 [1976]: 353, Mises 1981 [1922]: 64f.). This 
creates a ripe environment for a demagogue to seize power. As Jacob Talmon notes (1960: 104f.),
The ancients have already understood, and indeed witnessed, the phenomenon of extreme 
democracy leading straight to personal tyranny. Modern experience has added one link, the role 
of the totalitarian-democratic vanguard in a plebiscitary régime, posing as the people. The 
fervour and ceaseless activity of the believers, on the one hand, and intimidation practised on 
opponents and the lukewarm, on the other, are the instruments by which the desired “general 
will” is made to appear as the will of all. Only one voice is heard, and it is voiced with such an 
insistence, vehemence, self-righteous fervour and a tone of menace that all other voices are 
drowned, cowed, and silenced.
Such things have often happened in recent decades in Latin America, for example, “with the urban poor seeking 
salvation through a strong, populist leader” (Hague and Harrop 2007: 52). Thus, unlimited democracy will 
display a tendency to degenerate into demagogic authoritarian dictatorship, and from there, to nationalism 
(Makovi 2016a). This will only exacerbate any tendency for a democratic socialist government to resort to 
autarky and foreign belligerency to safeguard the integrity of the domestic economic plan and protect it from 
disruption by foreign market competition.
The democratic peace theory is therefore false, at least in its simplest form: it cannot be true that 
democracies never go to war against each other simply because they are democracies. If anything, unlimited 
democracies will go to war more often because they are nationalistic. If a populist demagogue wins a democratic 
election by declaring that Mexico's prosperity comes at the expense of the welfare of the United States, or by 
preaching the doctrine that Germans cannot be rich unless Frenchmen are poor, it is hard to understand how this 
will not tend to magnify international conflict. The doctrine that foreign commerce is a zero-sum game is 
incompatible with world peace. If there is any nation which is less likely to go to war, it is those nations which 
permit international free-trade at the expense of popular or national sovereignty because they understand that 
trade is a mutually beneficial, positive-sum game. Emphasis should be placed on the third of Woodrow Wilson's 
“Fourteen Points” (1918), calling for “The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the 
establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating 
themselves for its maintenance.” “Wilson['s] . . . idea that . . . democracies cannot derive any profit from 
conquest and therefore cling to peace . . . is valid only within a system of private ownership of the means of 
production, free enterprise, and unhampered market economy” (Mises 1984 [1944]: 5). The fact that Europe has 
been peaceful since World War II has less to do with democracy and more to do with the common market which 
has united Europe economically since 1957.8 This common market is certainly liberal but it is undemocratic 
insofar as it deprives domestic European states of complete democratic sovereignty. In other words, if 
democracies have in fact been less less likely to go to war, it is because they have tended to be more liberal than 
democratic.9
We can summarize this extended argument with the Manchester School's aphorism that “Where goods 
do not cross borders, armies will.” Domestic economic intervention cannot succeed without international 
isolation and restriction of trade. Foreigners cannot be allowed to undercut and circumvent domestic regulation. 
But this in turn leads to warfare – or at least, to hostile foreign relations. Whereas international free-trade creates 
a harmony of interests, domestic interventionism and protectionism give rise to conflicts of interest and foreign 
antagonisms. Thus, Nazi/Soviet military expansionism was merely a consequence of socialist economic policy 
pursued consistently to its final implications. At best, even if warfare is avoided, domestic interventionism still 
leads to isolation and insularity; nearly all contact with foreigners must be restricted in order to safeguard the 
integrity of the domestic economic plan. Democratic socialism must restrict international trade and foreign 
relations in order to ensure the effectiveness of the central plan and protect the people's democratic popular 
sovereignty. But this would give rise to consequences in foreign policy contrary to the cosmopolitan and 
humanitarian values of the democratic socialists. Democratic socialism is inconsistent with international 
multiculturalism, and it requires discriminating against foreigners – treating them as something other than one's 
fellow human beings possessing equal rights and dignity.
Therefore, democratic socialism or economic democracy is – like economic nationalism – incompatible 
with cosmopolitanism and international peace. Domestic interventionism cannot be sustained as long as imports 
are allowed undermine the plan. Thorough domestic interventionism is impossible without protectionism and 
national self-sufficiency. This in turn must result in either bellicosity, belligerency, and warfare, or else 
isolationism and complete disregard for foreigners. Either way, democratic socialism is therefore inconsistent 
with a philosophy which regards all human beings around the world as essentially equal in rights and dignity. 
The “democratic peace theorem” is not true – at least not in the form Woodrow Wilson conceived it. If 
democracies do not go to war, it is not because they are democratic, but it is because they agree to permit 
international free-trade. But democratic socialism would have to restrict foreign commerce, and so the 
democratic peace theorem would not apply.
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